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1 Introduction
An often heard refrain in the policy discourse is that rather than use progressive taxation to reduce in-
equality of incomes, the government should use equal public provision of education to reduce inequality
of education, and then let the distribution of income be whatever it turns out to be. Preference for
equalizing education over equalizing incomes is sometimes argued for in terms of the presumed greater
efficiency, since income taxation would distort the choice between labour effort and leisure. But perhaps
a stronger strand in the argument is that equalizing education equalizes opportunities, and that equality
of opportunity rather than equality of incomes should be the objective of policy.
Consider, then, an unequal society in which parents spend some of their earned incomes on the education
of their children, and this parental input together with equal provision of public education leads to the
educational outcomes for children. The government has at its disposal instruments of taxation as well
as the level of public provision of education. How should the government choose these instruments in
such a setting? The answer depends of course on the government’s objectives.
Since the earning of higher incomes requires the use of higher labour effort, the appropriate measure of
parental well-being is not income per se, but utility. One strand of the literature takes as the government’s
objective a social welfare function defined on the distribution of utilities, which in turn are the outcomes
of optimal parental choices on labour, leisure, and expenditure on inputs for children’s education. This
will be recognized as the classic ‘welfarist’ formulation of the problem emanating from the work of
Mirrlees (1971)—welfarist, because the government’s objective function depends on, and only on, the
‘utility outcomes’ (of parents in this case).
Contrast this with a ‘non-welfarist’ formulation in which the government cares about, and only about, the
distribution of educational outcomes, since this is the distribution of opportunity for the next generation.
Parental utility functions do not matter directly in the government’s objective function and thus neither
do inequalities of utilities or incomes. This follows the arguments of Roemer (1998), which draws on a
philosophical tradition going back to Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981), and Sen (1985), and distinguishes
between ‘circumstances’ (factors outside the control of the individual) and ‘effort’ (factors within the
individual’s control). In this view, inequalities attributable to circumstances are the only legitimate target
for government intervention.
The analytical distinction between welfarist and non-welfarist objective functions makes sharp the infor-
mal distinction between ‘outcomes-based’ and ‘opportunities-based’ objectives in the policy discourse.
It allows us to explore in a systematic way the alternative uses of taxation and public education provi-
sion under the two types of objectives. Is it the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under
opportunities-based objectives? If it is still used, what does the differential use of progressive taxation
under the two objectives depend upon? Is it the case that higher provision of equal public education can
advance the opportunities-based objective? Will the provision of public education in this case necessar-
ily be higher than when the objective is welfarist? These are the types of questions to which the policy
discourse gives rise.
There is a very large literature on the optimal choice of taxation and public provision of education in
the welfarist tradition.1 There is a small but growing literature on this same question in the equality
of opportunity tradition.2 But to our knowledge there is no literature that compares public policy on
taxation and education provision, directly comparing the classical welfarist formulation in the tradition
1 A small selection of papers is as follows: Balestrino et al. (2017); Blumkin and Sadka (2008); Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005);
Brett and Weymark (2003); Gasparini and Pinto (2006); Hare and Uplh (1979); Tuomala (1986); Ulph (1977).
2 See Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018); Roemer and Ünveren (2016); Valletta (2014).
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of Mirrlees (1971) with the non-welfarist equality of opportunity formulation which emanates from the
work of Roemer (1998). Our paper is a first step in this direction. By deriving and presenting optimal
taxation and public provision formulae for the two approaches in a comparable manner, we are able to
pinpoint the differences between them in a sharp way. We are also able to place alternative developments
in the literature in the context of the contrast between welfarist and non-welfarist frameworks of optimal
policy.
This paper frames the difference between ‘equality of outcomes’ and ‘equality of opportunity’ as the dis-
tinction between a ‘welfarist’ and a ‘non-welfarist’ objective function. Section 2 lays out the basic setup,
in which parents with unequal productivities choose labour effort and inputs to children’s education to
maximize a parental utility function. Section 3 sets out the base results for optimal taxation and public
education provision of the welfarist formulation, in which the social welfare function depends only on
parental utilities, as the benchmark for later comparison with the equality of opportunity case. Section
4 shows how the optimal tax and public provision formulae are changed when the objective function is
non-welfarist, specialized to depending only on the distribution of educational outcomes for children.
This section also contrasts our formulation of the objective function for equality of opportunity from
that proposed by Saez and Stantcheva (2016), which we argue does not fall in a pure ‘non-welfarist’
category. Sections 2–4 restrict themselves to the case of linear income taxation. Section 5 extends the
analysis to non-linear income taxation. Section 6 relates our analysis to that of Fleurbaey and Valletta
(2018) in the equality of opportunity framework. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Individual behaviour
The individual budget constraint is yi = (1− τ)zi + b = xi + ci, where zi = wili denotes labour income,
and τ is a linear income tax, which the government uses to finance a lump-sum transfer b. Individual
i allocates after-tax income y to private purchases of education c and other consumption x. In the first
version of the model, education is thought to benefit the children of the parents who invest in educa-
tion.
The government can intervene either by public provision of education or by subsidizing private pur-
chases of education. In the first case, utility is u = u
[
ei(ci,g),xi, li
]
, where g represents public provision
of education and ei represents the overall educational level.
The household maximizes the Lagrangian
u = u
[
ei(ci,g),xi, li
]
+λ
[
(1− τ)wili +b− xi− ci
]
.
Its maximum value is denoted by
vi = u [e(c∗,g),x∗, l∗]+λ [(1− τ)wl∗+b− x∗− c∗] .
The individual maximization also gives the demand functions ci = ci [(1− τ),b,g] and xi = xi [(1− τ),b,g]
as well as labour supply li = li [(1− τ),b,g].
In the case with no public provision but with a possible educational subsidy s, the budget constraint of
the household can be written as xi +(1− s)ci = (1− τ)zi + b. It is notationally simpler to normalize
the situation so that instead of the labour income tax, the government levies consumption taxes on
both education and other consumption, and deviations of uniform commodity taxation can be seen as
subsidies or taxes on education. Therefore, we work with a model with budget constraint of the form
∑ j q jxij = z
i+b, where q j = (p+ t j) denotes the consumer price of a good j = c,x, with producer prices
all equal to p, and t j represents the tax on good j (a subsidy when t j < 0). Now vi(q,b) and xi(q,b) are
the indirect utility and consumer demand functions.
2
3 A welfarist benchmark
3.1 Income taxation
A welfarist government maximizes ∑iW
{
vi [(1− τ),b,g]
}
subject to its budget constraint ∑i τwli =
Nb+Nπg, where π is the per-pupil cost of public education and N is the number of households, who
have different ability levels wi. The first-order conditions, shown in the Appendix, can be used to derive
the optimal linear income tax formula:
τ∗
1− τ∗
=
1
ε
(
1− z(β)
z̄
)
, (1)
where βi = W ′ ∂v
i
∂b is the social marginal value of income for person i and z(β) =
∑βizi
∑βi denotes the
welfare-weighted average income. The elasticity of total income is represented by ε = dz̄d(1−τ)
(1−τ)
z̄ . The
rule is the same as in Kanbur et al. (2018: section 2.1). The interpretation is the following: when the
government has a relatively large welfare weight on the lowest incomes, z(β) is small relative to mean
income (z̄), and the optimal income tax rate is high. On the other hand, the optimal tax rate declines
when ε increases.
An alternative way of writing the optimum rule is one due to Dixit and Sandmo (1977), which utilizes
the notion of net (of tax revenue) social marginal value of income, following Diamond (1975):
ρi =
βi
µ
+ τwi
∂li
∂b
. (2)
Using this definition, the tax rule can be expressed as
τ∗ =
cov(ρi,zi)
1
N ∑i w
i ∂l̃i
∂(1−τ)
, (3)
where ∂l̃
i
∂(1−τ) is the derivative of compensated labour supply. Again, distributional concerns are taken
into account in the numerator and the denominator captures efficiency impacts.
3.2 Public provision
The rule for optimal provision of education is given by
∑
i
βimi = µ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (4)
where mi = v
i
p
λ is the marginal rate of substitution for the public good and µ is the Lagrange multiplier of
the government budget constraint. This is close to the first-best provision of a publicly provided private
good, but the marginal rate of substitution at the left is a weighted one, and at the right a tax revenue
term reduces the costs of provision if an increase in public provision increases labour supply. Following
Sandmo (1998), the rule can also be written as
N
∑i βimi
∑i βi
= γ
(
Nπ−∑τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (5)
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where γ = µβ̄ and
1
N ∑β
i = β̄. This means that Equation (5) can also be written as
∑
i
mi(1+δ) = γ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (6)
where
δ =
cov(βi,mi)
β̄m̄
(7)
is the distributional characteristic of publicly provided education. If the government pays no attention to
distributional matters, δ = 0 and the left of Equation (6) is just the conventional sum of the marginal rate
of substitution. When distributional concerns matter, the social benefit of public provision increases if
the marginal valuation of the publicly provided good is higher for households with low incomes (i.e. high
social marginal value of income). In addition, the government needs to take into account the impact of
public provision of tax revenues it collects from labour income via the term ∑i τwi ∂l
i
∂g . If public provision
boosts income, then the costs of public provision are reduced relative to the case where public provision
would have no impact on tax revenues.
An alternative rule can be derived with the help of the notion of net social marginal value of in-
come:
ρi =
βi
µ
+ τwi
∂li
∂b
. (8)
Equation (52) in the Appendix implies that ρ̄ = 1. It is shown in the Appendix that the public good rule
can also be expressed as
∑
i
mi = Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
−Ncov(ρi,mi). (9)
Here, if the covariance is positive (public provision is valued by low-income people with high social net
marginal value of income), it reduces the costs of provision and pushes educational expenses up. To the
best of our knowledge, the welfarist public provision rule has not been written in this form before.
3.3 Commodity taxation: subsidizing education
The government maximizes ∑iW i
(
vi(b,q)
)
subject to its budget constraint ∑i ∑ j t jxij −Nb = R. It is
useful to redefine
ρi =
βi
µ
+∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
(10)
as the net social marginal utility of income for person i. This notion again takes into account the direct
marginal social gain, βi , and the tax revenue impact arising from commodity demand changes. The rule
for optimal commodity taxation for good k is shown to be
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂x̃ik
∂q j
= Ncov(ρi,xik). (11)
The left-hand side of the rule is the aggregate compensated change (weighted by commodity taxes) of
good k when commodity prices are changed. The right-hand side refers to the covariance of the net
marginal social welfare of income and consumption of the good in question. The rule says that the
consumption of those goods whose demand is the greatest for people with low net social marginal value
of income (presumably the rich) should be discouraged by the tax system. Likewise the consumption of
goods such as necessities should be encouraged by the tax system. This means that education ought to
be subsidized only if its relative valuation is higher among the low-income households.
4
4 Equality of opportunity
As our framework is strictly paternalistic, we start with a general formulation in which the government
maximizes a general paternalistic objective function, ∑i P(ei(ci,g),xi, li,g). After having derived general
tax and public provision rules, we interpret them using societal objectives that only depend on an eq-
uitable distribution of education—in our case on ∑i P(ei,xi, li,g) = ∑i Oi
{
ei
[
ci ((1− τ),b,g) ,g
]}
. For
the general case the first-order conditions are:
∑
i
dPi
d(1− τ)
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
+wili
)
= 0 (12)
∑
i
dPi
db
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂b
−1
)
= 0 (13)
∑
i
dPi
dg
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂g
−π
)
= 0, (14)
where the total derivative is, for example in the case of g, dP
i
dg =
∂Pi
∂g +
∂Pi
∂ei
∂ei
∂ci
∂ci
∂g +
∂Pi
∂xi
∂xi
∂g +
∂Pi
∂li
∂li
∂g . In other
words, the total impact of extra public provision depends on its direct valuation by the social planner
and its indirect impact on the consumption of goods and labour supply.
4.1 Income taxation
One way of writing the optimal tax rule (as shown in the Appendix) is:
τ∗ =
cov(ρi,zi)
1
N ∑i w
i ∂l̃i
∂(1−τ)
+
D
1
N ∑i w
i ∂l̃i
∂(1−τ)
. (15)
The first term is the same as in the welfarist case in Equation (3). The second term, where D = CbN
∑i zi
N −
C(1−τ)
N (within which Cb = ∑i
dPi
db −∑i β
i ; C1−τ = ∑i
dPi
d(1−τ) −∑i β
izi), is a corrective term that takes into
account the differences between marginal paternalistic and welfarist valuation of changes in b and 1−τ.
The presence of D drives the tax rate up if the social value of greater b is large, relative to the welfarist
case, or the social value of the increase in the take-home pay (1− τ) is small. The basic principle that
the optimal tax rule is a combination of a welfarist term and a corrective term is in line with the general
idea expressed (for the non-linear tax) by Kanbur et al. (2006).
For this particular Dixit–Sandmo type of optimal tax rate expression, the interpretation using the function
∑i Oi
{
ei
[
ci ((1− τ),b,g) ,g
]}
is not particularly instructive. However, a rule in line with the welfarist
term in Equation (1) is more intuitive. It is derived in the Appendix and is given by
τ∗
1− τ∗
=
1
ε
(
1− Õ
z
)
, (16)
where
Õ =
∑O′ ∂e
i
∂ci
∂ci
∂(1−τ)
∑O′ ∂e
i
∂ci
∂ci
∂b
(17)
is the impact of the income tax on education, relative to the effect of additional income on education.
If increasing taxes leads to a large drop in educational attainment (the numerator in Equation (17)), Õ
goes down, which decreases the tax at the optimum. If, in turn, the sensitivity of educational investment
on income (the denominator in Equation (17)) becomes larger, the optimal tax is increased. The higher
the income effects—especially at the bottom of the distribution, as they get a higher weight in the social
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evaluation function—the greater the increase. A budget-neutral increase in the marginal tax rate also
implies a greater lump-sum benefit—that is, a policy that increases progressivity. The implications of
this analysis are collected in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. A government that only cares about inequality in educational outcomes should also
use progressive income taxation, in addition to possibly subsidizing education. The tax system is more
progressive when the increase in educational attainment is highly sensitive to increases in income, es-
pecially among those at the bottom of the educational distribution.
4.2 Public provision
Consider first a general paternalistic formulation for public provision. It can be written, following Equa-
tion (4) as:
∑
i
βimi = µ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
−Cg, (18)
where Cg = ∑i
dPi
dg −∑i β
imi. In other words, again the rule includes a corrective term that compares pa-
ternalistic versus welfarist marginal value of an increase in public provision. If the paternalistic valuation
exceeds the welfarist one, the term reduces the costs of public provision.
We now turn to examine the public provision rule in more detail when equality of opportunity concerns
affect the provision rule. Let us now denote O′ ∂e
i
∂ci
∂ci
∂b = β
i
O, which is again the marginal social (gross)
value of income, but now for an equality of opportunity government. Let
miO =
(
dei
dg
)
/
(
dei
db
)
(19)
denote the efficiency of public provision in increasing education relative to the income effect. Then,
Equation (18) can also be written as
∑
i
βiOm
i
O = µ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (20)
which also implies
∑
i
miO(1+δO) = γO
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (21)
where γO = µβ̄O and
δO =
cov(βiO,m
i
O)
β̄Om̄O
. (22)
This is now the distributional characteristic in the equality of opportunity case. To interpret the provision
rule in Equation (21), notice first that in the case where the distributional characteristic δO is zero,
implying that the government is not at all averse to inequality in educational attainment, the left-hand
side just measures the relative benefit of affecting overall educational level via the publicly provided
good versus leaving the income to the households. This is captured by the sum of miO. This benefit
needs to be weighed against the cost of provision, captured by the first term at the right, γONπ = Nπ in
the case with no distributional concerns. As in the welfarist case, the cost of provision is reduced if the
publicly provided good leads to an increase in the tax revenue (this happens if ∂l
∂g is positive).
Consider now the influence of aversion against inequality in educational attainment, captured by δO.
The denominator in miO is always positive (education is a normal good). The sign of the numerator in
6
miO depends on the net impact of public provision on education. As we discussed above, it is likely
to be positive, but if public provision is a substitute for private purchases of education at the lower
end of the income distribution and a complement at the upper end, the net impact of public provision
could well be higher in the upper end. With no distributional concerns, that would lead to an increase
in the benefits of public provision. However, since βiO is small for households with high incomes, the
covariance in this case would be negative, meaning that education should be under-provided relative
to the case with no distributional concerns. Naturally, in the case that miO were higher for households
with low incomes, the covariance would become positive, leading to over-provision of education. This
discussion is summarized below.
Proposition 2. Optimal public provision of education for a government whose social welfare function
is motivated by equality of opportunity concerns is increasing in the relative impact of public provision
versus additional income on educational attainment. The provision rule suggests distorting the public
provision upwards if education services are more sensitive to public provision at the lower end of the
distribution.
The proposition suggests that the role of public education depends on whether low-income students sub-
stitute or complement education by public provision. Peltzman (1973) suggested that public education
could crowd out private purchases of schooling, and could even reduce overall schooling consump-
tion. Empirical research has since found some support for the hypothesis, though the overall evidence is
mixed. Cohodes and Goodman (2014), Cellini (2009), and Long (2004) find strong crowding-out effects
in the context of public colleges in the USA, suggesting that the net effect on education consumption of
increasing public provision could be zero or even negative. However, in a similar context, Castleman
and Long (2013) do not find public provision to affect private education consumption. Slightly more
positive results have been found in the context of preschool programmes. Several papers have found
the net impact of public provision to be positive, as private provision is either not substituted for public
provision, or at least is substituted only partly (Bassok et al. 2014; Bastos and Straume 2016; Brinkman
et al. 2017; Cascio 2009; Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013).
Only a few papers look at heterogeneity of crowding out across income levels. Cohodes and Goodman
(2014) find that public college subsidies increased enrolment among the poorest students, even though
on net the programme reduced education consumption (as the poorest students formed a small share
of the target population). However, Long (2004) finds the opposite, that the poorest students are more
sensitive to public subsidies and education crowding out is therefore more severe at the lower end of
the income distribution. In the preschool context, Brinkman et al. (2017) find no heterogeneity between
poorer and less poor families in Indonesia, but Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) find that crowding out
is focused among higher-income families in the U.S., as they substitute private care for less expensive
public care.
There is not much literature on the income effect on consumption of education, but Long’s (2004)
simulations suggest that changing the in-kind tuition subsidy to public schools into a non-tied grant that
can be used in any college, students would consume more education by choosing four-year colleges over
two-year colleges, and more selective private colleges over public colleges. Low-income students would
be more sensitive to the change than high-income students.
Given the mixed results in the empirical literature, the sign of the numerator of miO is likely to be very
context-specific, although we consider it plausible that it would be more positive or less negative for
poorer families. There is suggestive evidence that the denominator would be positive, and more strongly
so for the disadvantaged students.
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4.3 Commodity taxation: subsidizing education
The government maximizes ∑i Oi
(
ei(q,b)
)
subject to its budget constraint ∑i ∑ j t jxij −Nb = 0. It is
shown in the Appendix that optimal commodity taxation can be characterized with the rule below:
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂x̃ij
∂q j
= Ncov(ρiO,x
i
k)−
1
µ∑i
O′
∂ẽi
∂qk
, (23)
where ρiO is again the net social marginal value of income. The left-hand side of Equation (23) is the
compensated aggregated change in the demand of each good. The right-hand side now includes, in com-
parison to the welfarist rule in Equation (11), an extra term on top of the covariance rule. Moreover, the
covariance rule now measures the relation between the paternalistic net social marginal value of income
and the demand for a particular good. According to the second term at the right, when considering the
price of education (k = e), the demand for education should be encouraged by the tax system, since
the own price effect on compensated demand is always negative. This term works towards subsidizing
consumption by the tax system. The second term, the covariance term, takes into account distributional
concerns, now measured in terms of equality in access to education. If education is highly appreciated
by households with high marginal social net value of income (low-income households), this term works
towards further effective subsidies on education. In cases where education is valued more by households
with low social weight, the covariance term is negative, and it tends to reduce educational subsidies. This
leads to Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. Educational services should be encouraged by the tax system. The greater the relative
price sensitivity of educational services among households with higher income, the lower the degree of
encouragement.
4.4 Interpretation using generalized social marginal welfare weights
We now contrast our approach with that of Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and work with their notion of
generalized marginal social welfare weights. These weights are represented by ξ i(ci,xi,zi,χ i,u,χ i,b,χ i,s).
Here, χ i,u denotes characteristics that enter the private utility function, χ i,s those that are accounted for
only by the social planner, and χ i,b those characteristics that affect both individual and social welfare.
We extend their approach, which was used in the case of income tax alone, to also cover public provision
and commodity taxation. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) show in their online appendix how, in the case in
which the individual utility is a money-metric one, the approach can be thought of as if the government
were maximizing ∑i ξ ivi. When indirect utility is money-metric, the social marginal value of income to
individual i is just ξ i. If the government were welfaristic with a social welfare function of W {v}, then
ξ i = ∂W
∂vi .
We can show that the public good provision rule is then simply
∑
i
mi(1+δ iSS) = γ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (24)
where
δ iSS =
cov(ξ i,mi)
ξm
, (25)
with the distributional characteristic of publicly provided education now defined on the basis of ξ . Al-
ternatively, the rule can be written as
∑
i
mi = Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
−Ncov(ρiSS,mi). (26)
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Here,
ρiSS =
ξ i
µ
+ τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
(27)
is the generalized net social marginal value of income.
In the case of commodity taxation, the optimal tax rule is of the form
1
N ∑i
∑
j
t j
∂x̃ik
∂q j
= cov(ρiSS,x
i
k), (28)
where
ρiSS =
gi
µ
+∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
. (29)
However, the Saez–Stantcheva (SS) approach only works for such social preferences that are not paternalistic—
that is, they accept individual welfare as a starting point. Therefore, our formulation above, where O(e)
is a function of education alone and does not put any welfare weight to the consumption of other goods
or leisure, is not compatible with the SS approach. Alternative formulations of equality of opportunity
could be in line with the SS framework and we explore them below in Section 6.
5 Non-linear income taxation
5.1 Mixed taxation
The model is now extended so that the government still taxes (or subsidizes) commodities using linear
instruments, but it can tax income in a non-linear fashion. Income after direct taxation is yi = zi−T (zi),
where T denotes any non-linear function. Again, yi is spent on consumption goods, subject to linear
taxes, such that yi = qxi, where q = p+ t, with p denoting producer prices.
It will be useful to utilize the dual approach for this analysis, as done by Tuomala (1990). We denote
the expenditure function as E(q,z,w,v), which is defined as the minimum expenditure to reach utility
u(x,z,w) = v. The partially indirect utility is v(q,b,z,w), which results from the household choosing
consumption optimally given a budget constraint qx = b, where b = E is the expenditure available for
the linearly taxed good.
As always in a non-linear income tax problem, we need to take into account the household incentive
compatibility constraint. Using the expenditure function, it can be stated as (for any w,w′):
E [q,z(w),u(x(w),z(w),w),w]≤ E
[
q,z(w),u(x(w),z(w),w′),w′
]
, (30)
since the right-hand side is greater than or equal to qx(w). On the other hand, the latter is the same as
the left-hand side. This means that w′ = w is the value that minimizes the expression at the right. The
derivative with respect to w′ vanishes at w so that
Evuw +Ew = 0.
This serves as the incentive compatibility constraint. Alternatively, it can also be written as
v′(w)+
Ew
Ev
= 0, (31)
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because uw = v′(w) by the envelope theorem.
The resource constraint is ∫
(z− px̃) f dw = 0, (32)
where x̃(q,z,v,w) denotes the compensated demand for goods.
Kanbur et al. (2006) study in this setting optimal taxation when the government minimizes income
poverty, whereas in the present paper the government objective is to achieve a suitable distribution of
education,
∫
O [ẽ(q,z,v,w)] f dw. Note that the government objective only depends on one of the con-
sumption goods—education—and it is written in terms of compensated demand similarly to the rest of
the analysis that follows.
As shown in the Appendix, the rule for optimal commodity taxation can be written as∫
t
∂x̃
∂q
f dw =−
∫
ω
∂x
∂w
dw−
∫ 1
µ
O′
∂ẽ
∂q
f dw, (33)
where ω = E−1v α/µ > 0. In this formula, the left-hand side is the compensated aggregated change in
educational purchases and the first term at the right is the conventional welfarist term. Originally derived
by Mirrlees (1976), it states that the consumption of goods that are valued relatively highly by high-
ability types—that is if ∂x
∂w > 0—should be discouraged by the tax system. Further analysis has shown
that this term vanishes if utility is separable between commodity demand and leisure (Atkinson and
Stiglitz 1976).
In addition, there is a new term that measures the impact of commodity taxes on educational purchases.
The own price effect is negative, implying that the term is on the whole positive. This works towards
encouraging the consumption of education, and this term becomes greater with higher social welfare
weight for the household in question (i.e. for low-skilled households) and with more price-elastic de-
mand. This result is summarized below.
Proposition 4. In an optimal mixed tax system, the consumption of educational services should be
encouraged by the tax system. The larger the compensated own-price elasticity of demand, in particular
among low-skilled households, the greater the degree of encouragement.
A corollary to this finding is that even if preferences are separable between commodity demand and
leisure, uniform commodity taxation is not optimal. The reason is that the social planner still wants to
encourage the consumption of educational services.
We now turn to examining the non-linear part of taxation. For that purpose, one takes the derivative of
the Lagrangian in Equation (70) with respect to z. The optimality condition is
O′
(
∂ẽ(q,z,v,w)
∂z
)
f −µ∂x̃
∂x
f +α
∂(Ew/Ev)
∂z
= 0. (34)
This expression can be modified (see the Appendix) to obtain a condition for the effective marginal tax
rate (i.e. the increase in labour income and commodity taxes when income increases)—which is just the
marginal income tax rate in case in which there are no commodity taxes or subsidies:(
1− t ∂x
∂b
)
s+1+ t
∂x
∂z
=−1
f
ωsw−
1
µ
O′
∂ẽ
∂z
, (35)
where s = vzvb is the marginal rate of substitution between z = wl and expenditure on goods, ω > 0, and
sw is the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution with respect to ability level. The left-hand side
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measures the effective marginal tax rate. The first terms at the right are the same as in the standard Mir-
rlees (1976) welfaristic model. The second term at the right is the impact of the equality of opportunity
concerns on the marginal tax rate. In general it means that the marginal tax rate is not zero at the end
points. The last term consists of two components, the first capturing the concavity of the social objective
function and the second the link between labour supply and private educational purchases. If an increase
in earnings leads to an increase in educational purchases by the households, the last term is on the whole
negative, and implies a reduction in the tax rate. The impact of this concern is greater for low-income
households, as the social marginal welfare weight tends to be larger for them. These observations lend
themselves to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In an optimal mixed tax system, the effective marginal tax rates at the end points are
not zero. The effective marginal tax is, ceteris paribus, smaller when labour income and educational
purchases are complements. The higher is the social marginal value of education at that ability level,
the larger this effect is.
Naturally, when income and education are substitutes, effective marginal tax rates tend to increase.
These mechanisms serve as a way for the government to indirectly influence the educational level via
labour supply. An interesting case is one in which income increases at one ability level raise the demand
for education and lead to reductions in education at another. Consider, for instance, a situation in which
at low ability levels income and education are complements, whereas they would be substitutes at higher
ability levels. This would mean that the effective marginal tax rate tends to go down at low income levels
and is pushed upwards at higher incomes. As always in optimal tax research, one needs to remember
that this reasoning is only valid when other things are equal, and these other things may not remain
intact as the optimality conditions are evaluated at different levels when making comparisons between
traditional welfarist versus non-welfarist analyses.
5.2 Public provision
The provision rule for public education is presented here for the case in which it is financed with a non-
linear income tax. For brevity, subsidies and other indirect taxes are assumed away, but enlarging the
analysis to cover them would be straightforward along the lines of the analysis by Pirttilä and Tuomala
(2004: section 5). The government objective function is now written as
∫
O [e(c̃(z,v,w,g),g)] f dw.
Again we show in the Appendix how this can be further modified to arrive at the following provision
rule: ∫
π f dw =
∫
σ f dw−
∫
ωσwdw+
∫ 1
µ
O′
(
∂e
∂c
∂c̃(z,v,w,g)
∂q
+
∂e
∂g
)
. (36)
The rule compares the marginal cost of public provision (the left-hand side) with the marginal benefits
(right-hand side). The first two terms are familiar from the welfarist case. They measure the willingness
to pay for the public provision and the way this willingness is linked with ability level. The last term at
the right is novel: it measures the impact of public provision on equality of education. The greater the
overall impact (both directly and indirectly via private purchases), the higher the marginal benefits of
public provision.
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6 Equality of opportunity as fairness
The last approach to equality of opportunity we apply is a version of the fairness theory developed, for
example, by Fleurbaey (2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). It is non-welfarist and yet based on
individual preferences,3 and is closely associated with theories of equality of opportunity developed, for
example, by Roemer and Trannoy (2015, 2016).
Like modern theories of justice and equality of opportunity, the fairness theory seeks a balance between
reward (right to fruits of own effort) and compensation (right for compensation due to bad circumstances
beyond individual control). This is done through axioms specifying the acceptable transfers, usually
Pigou–Dalton transfers, and accepting the Pareto principle. These, together with a money-metric mea-
sure of individual welfare proposed by Hansson (1973)4 usually lead to a maximin or leximin social
welfare ordering over the money-metric utilities. The money-metric welfare is obtained by asking what
lump-sum income (transfer), with everybody facing the same salient (determined by used requirements
of justice) circumstances, would make an individual indifferent between her present state and the state
in which she faces the equalized circumstances. We focus on this ‘egalitarian equivalence’ concept of
fairness, as it is closest to the other recent theories of equality of opportunity. This obviously requires
fixing the salient circumstances.
The questions studied in this paper have been studied from the fairness point of view in a closely related
paper by Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) focusing on optimal (non-linear) income taxation. We use and
extend the linear taxation version presented in the working paper version of their paper (Fleurbaey
and Valletta 2013). In this section we (1) show that the Fleurbaey–Valletta model and the model used
in the previous sections produce qualitatively similar results for linear income taxation and education
subsidies; (2) show that the results from the fairness approach can be formally presented in a way
similar to results in the previous sections, improving the comparability, and also show more detailed
characterizations of the optimal fair policies; and (3) extend the fair tax model with commodity taxation
and public provision of education.
In the Fleurbaey–Valletta-model, education improves personal productivity instead of increasing indi-
vidual welfare as in the models used in the previous sections. In both approaches the key is the education
production function, that is the education level is a function of private investment and public provision
of education. Fleurbaey and Valletta use it in the form of the (individual) cost of obtaining a certain level
of education for a given public level of public provision. The cost function is taken as a circumstance
facing individuals.
The education production function used above, ei
(
ci,g
)
, can be inverted to find the cost of obtaining a
given level of education:
ci = ci
(
ei,g
)
,
∂ci
∂ei
> 0,
∂ci
∂g
≤ 0. (37)
Fleurbaey and Valletta, based on Valletta (2014), argue that the salient circumstances are the average
productivity and the average cost of education. The same justice requirements can be applied to the
model used above, but we also indicate how the results would be modified if education also has an
impact on individual productivity. Thus the transfer needed to make the individual indifferent between
her present state and the state with harmonized circumstances is the value function of the optimization
3 See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018); Fleurbaey et al. (2003). It is also consistent with Pareto efficiency.
4 This is one way of avoiding Arrow’s impossibility result.
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problem:
min x+ c(e,g)−wl (38)
s.t. ui (e,x, l)≥ ui
(
ei,xi, li
)
Here, ui
(
ei,xi, li
)
is the welfare of individual i at the current allocation of resources. Thus, the value
function (the transfer) for individual i is
ϑi = ϑi
(
c,w,ui
(
ei,xi, li
))
. (39)
Note that we allow for heterogeneity in individual utility functions and assume individuals to be re-
sponsible for their preferences. An individual’s welfare is, for the case of linear income tax and public
provision of education, given by the indirect utility function vi (t,b,g), as above, and is analogous for
the case of commodity taxes.
Social welfare is maximized by maximizing the welfare of the worst-off person.5 We give this person
index o (so that individuals are indexed as: i = 1, ...,N−1,o).
The case of non-linear taxation is dealt with thoroughly by Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) and Valletta
(2014). In general, their results are in line with the results here: the optimal income tax is progressive, but
there are modifications especially in the case where subsidization/taxation of education is also allowed.
This shows up also in the case of linear taxation.
Our main results specify exact conditions that the worst-off person’s consumption patterns, willingness
to pay, and investments have to hold for commodity taxation to favour the worst-off person, the social
cost of public provision to be reduced, and private investment to education to be taxed (or subsidized).
These are more detailed than obtained in the welfarist or equality of opportunity approach analysed
above. The details of the derivation are presented in the Appendix.
6.1 Linear taxation
Optimal policies maximize the money-metric measure of the worst-off person, ϑo
(
w̄, c̄,vi (1− τ,b)
)
. In
the Appendix we show that the tax rule satisfies
τ∗
1− τ∗
=
1−Aθo
∑i θ iε il,1−τ
. (40)
Here, A ≡ 1− τ∑i w
ili
Nb ε
i
l,b > 0, and ε
i
y,x is the elasticity of y with respect to x. θ i denotes the share of
individual i’s income in total income, θ i ≡ wili
∑i wili
. The tax rate is positive and below unity as long as
∑i θ iε il,1−τ > 0, which is plausible, and when Aθ
o < 1. The formula in Equation (40) is analogous to our
results for linear tax in the other cases. The difference is that it focuses on the income of the worst-off
citizen relative to the average income as the key parameter. In other words, the theory proposes this ratio
as the key parameter to look for when analysing the fairness of linear income tax systems.
In the case where education improves productivity, the qualitative results are exactly the same as above,
but one must add terms including elasticities of labour supply with respect to the net-of-tax rate and the
demogrant, as well as elasticities of wage with respect to the same variables. In effect, the elasticities
that matter are the elasticities of individual incomes with respect to tax and the demogrant.
5 Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) discuss conditions for the existence of a worst-off person.
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6.2 Public provision
The optimality conditions in the fairness case can be written in exactly the same format as the welfaristic
optimality conditions in the previous sections. This is as the fair social welfare function gives βoF ≡
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂b as the marginal social welfare weight of the worst-off person, while the weight for the others is
βiF = 0, i 6= o (as ∂ϑ
o
∂vi = 0). Thus, the public provision rule can be expressed as follows:
βoFm
o = µ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
. (41)
This is the fairness equivalent to the welfarist public provision rule (Equation 4). It is difficult to infer
from Equation (41) what it implies for public education compared to the public provision and to the
Samuelson-efficient provision. In both cases, though, if increased public education increases tax rev-
enue, the cost of public provision is lower than in the Samuelsonian case. But there are other effects.
To get ahead, note that βoFm
o = ∑i βiFm
i, and hence Equation (41) can be rewritten as, equivalent to
Equation (6),
∑
i
mi (1+δF) = µ
(
Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂g
)
, (42)
where δF =
cov(βiF ,mi)
β̄F m̄
, with β̄F ≡ ∑i β
i
F
N =
βoF
N .
The ‘fair’ demand for public education is higher (or the cost of public provision lower) than the Samuelson-
efficient demand if δF > 0. This holds (see the Appendix) if and only if
mo >
∑
N−1
i=1 m
i
N−1
, (43)
otherwise the demand is reduced. Thus, if the worst-off person values education more than the other
citizens on average, the fairness criterion suggests, ceteris paribus, extension of public education. But
this does not have to be the case.
The result is also different from the welfarist case. In the welfarist case distributional concerns (social
value of income to low-income earners) increase the value of public provision if it covaries positively
with the private valuation of education. In the fairness case, only the private valuation of education by
the worst-off person matters.
This result can be further developed, as in the welfarist case above, by again defining the net social
marginal value of income to person i as ρiF =
βiF
µ + τw
i ∂li
∂b .
6 Using the Edwards et al. (1994) decomposi-
tion (Equation 54), this results in:
∑
i
mi = Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
−Ncov(ρiF ,mi). (44)
As βiF = 0 for all but the worst-off person, ρ
i
F = τw
i ∂li
∂b < 0 for all i 6= o: their net social marginal value
of income is negative. Equation (44) tells us that if cov
(
ρiF ,m
i
)
> 0 then the (social) cost of public
provision (the left-hand side of Equation (44)) is reduced. Utilizing again the structure of the net social
marginal value of income in our special case and the fact implied by Equation (88) that ∑i ρ
i
F
N ≡ ρ̄F = 1,
this holds if and only if (for a proof see the Appendix)
mo >
N−1
∑
i=1
1− τ ∂li
∂b
∑
N−1
j=1
(
1− τ ∂l j
∂b
)mi. (45)
6 Note that with endogenous productivity this would be ρiF =
βiF
µ + τw
i ∂li
∂b + τl
i ∂wi
∂b .
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Again the crucial requirement is that the worst-off person puts a relatively high value upon publicly
provided education. This does not have to be the case.
A third interpretation for the optimal education policy is:
mo =
Nπ−∑i τwi ∂l
i
∂g
N−∑i τwi ∂l
i
∂b
. (46)
This can be rewritten as
Nmo =
Nπ−∑i τ w
ili
g ε
i
l,g
1−∑i τ w
ili
Nb ε
i
l,b
. (47)
Here, ε il,b ≡
∂li
∂b
b
li is the income elasticity of labour supply and ε
i
l,g is the corresponding elasticity with
respect to public provision of education. We know that ε il,b < 0 if leisure is a normal good, as we
assume.
This formulation is the equivalent to the standard optimality condition for optimal public good produc-
tion. The left-hand side of Equation (47) gives the willingness to pay for the public education and again
highlights the importance of the willingness to pay for public education by the worst-off person. This is
important, as Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) argue, because the worst-off person is not only one of the
deserving poor, but also a person with high cost of education (e.g. due to the high cost of reaching a
given level of education). This can arise, for example, if public education does not reduce the overall
cost of education, which is the case when the education level is very insensitive to changes in public
education: ∂e
o
∂g is small. This would mean that public education is not very effective in improving the
social welfare (nor the welfare of the worst-off person). It raises the possibility that taxing education is
optimal.
Note that the optimal income tax rate is exactly the same as in the case of pure linear tax system without
public provision.
6.3 Commodity taxation
Using βiF as above (β
o
F ≡ ∂ϑ
o
∂vo
∂vo
∂b ; β
i
F = 0, i 6= o), the optimal commodity taxes satisfy the condition,
similar to the welfarist case above,
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂x̃ik
∂q j
= Ncov
(
ρiF ,x
i
k
)
, (48)
where
ρiF =
βiF
µ
+∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
. (49)
As in the welfarist case, this means that if the individuals with the greatest social weight tend consume
less of good k than the people with less weight, the commodity taxes are set to reduce the consumption
of the good. In the fairness case we can actually say something more specific. It can be shown that the
covariance is negative if and only if:
xok <
N−1
∑
i=1
αi
(∑iαi)
xik, (50)
where αi ≡ 1−∑ j t j
∂xij
∂b . The consumption of good k by the worst-off person must be below a weighted
average of the consumption of the same good by other individuals for the commodity taxes to punish
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the consumption of the good. The intuition is clear: the investment by the worst-off is taxed but so are
all other investments, which, on average, are higher than the investment by the worst-off. This implies
that the gain in education tax revenue is high enough to either reduce the income tax rate or increase the
demogrant b enough to increase the (money-metric) welfare of the worst-off person.
This result is analogous (but not exactly the same) to the result of Fleurbaey and Valletta (2013). In the
more general case, where the optimal income tax rate can vary by the level of income, this result does
not hold (Fleurbaey and Valletta 2018). Instead, the education investments are to be subsidized up to
some level, after which the subsidy rate equals 0, but are never taxed.
7 Conclusion
Let us return to the four questions posed in the introduction, which emerge from the policy discourse.
Is it the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under opportunities-based objectives? We have
shown that the argument of ‘progressive taxation for welfarist objectives and equal provision of public
education for equality of opportunity objectives’ poses a false dichotomy. Progressive taxation is a potent
instrument for equalizing opportunity through equalizing education outcomes. What does the differential
use of progressive taxation under the two objectives depend upon? We have derived and presented
optimal tax formulae in a way that facilitates comparison between the two regimes. When educational
outcomes are highly sensitive to parental inputs relative to public provision, perhaps paradoxically the
case for progressive taxation tends to be stronger under the equality of opportunity objective.
Is it the case that higher provision of public education can advance the opportunity-based objective?
Will the provision of public education in this case necessarily be higher than when the objective is wel-
farist? We have shown how answers to these questions depend on the nature of the ‘education production
function’—the precise way in which parental and public inputs go together to produce educational out-
comes for children. The extent of public provision is relatively low, if education is valued relatively
more by high-income households (as might well be the case).
The answers to these questions illustrate how our framework can help to address specific questions in
the policy discourse. Our analysis has, however, been wider ranging. We have used our framework
to assess commodity taxation, where we get results on education subsidies similar to those on public
provision. We have analysed non-linear income taxation under the two regimes and shown that, unlike
for the welfarist case, for equality of opportunity the effective marginal tax rates should not be set to zero
at the end points of ability distribution. We have also highlighted how the generalized welfare weights
framework of Saez and Stantcheva (2016) cannot fully capture the non-welfarism inherent in equality of
opportunity objectives.
Our paper relates to a recent, growing literature on taxation in an equality of opportunity and fairness
framework. Most recently, Roemer and Ünveren (2016) set up an intergenerational model in which
the current generation makes decisions on education for their children, the future generation. They use
public provision of education as the tool to equalize opportunities. The taxes, however, are not used for
redistribution but only to finance the public provision of education. Their numerical simulations show
that when private acquisition of education is possible, it can undo the intended effect of state provision.
They also consider the implications of banning private purchases of education.
Other recent contributions related to our paper are those by Fleurbaey (2006), Valletta (2014), and Fleur-
baey and Valletta (2018). These works extend the literature on fair taxation (e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet
2006, 2011) by considering optimal taxation together with goods such as education and health expendi-
ture, which affect the individual’s labour productivity and over which they also have direct preferences.
16
We have discussed Fleurbaey and Valletta’s (2018) model extensively in Section 6. They build on Val-
letta’s (2014) simpler model by considering a continuum of types and outcomes, and consider a broader
context of human capital investment, which can mean either education or health expenditures, or a com-
bination of both. Unlike our paper, both of these works only consider the case of public subsidies and
not of direct public provision. Further, multi-dimensional heterogeneity makes it quite complicated to
obtain more general results. In this paper we have presented a formulation that relates the Fleurbaey and
Valletta (2018) formulation to conventional formulations in the literature, allowing easier comparisons
and understandings.
Equality of opportunity has emerged as a major framework for the public policy discourse. This paper
has attempted to present a framework in which the consequences of this framework can be compared
to those of the welfarist literature. In the process we have asked and answered a number of specific
questions on taxation and public provision to show the utility of the formulation. In particular, we
have shown that progressive taxation and equality of opportunity are not opposed to each other. A rich
research agenda lies ahead.
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Appendix
Welfarist benchmark
The Lagrangian for a welfarist government is
∑
i
W
{
vi [(1− τ),b,g]
}
+µ
(
∑
i
(1−a)wili−Nb−Nπg
)
,
where a = 1− τ. The first-order conditions of the government optimization problem with respect to
1− τ, b, and g, are:
∑
i
W ′
∂vi
∂(1− τ)
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
−wili
)
= 0 (51)
∑
i
W ′
∂vi
∂b
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂b
−1
)
= 0 (52)
∑
i
W ′
∂vi
∂g
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂g
−π
)
= 0 (53)
Equations (51) and (52) can be used to derive the optimal linear income tax in Equation (1) (see Kanbur
et al. 2018).
As per public good provision, Edwards et al. (1994) show that the following Slutsky-type property
∂li
∂g
=
∂l̃i
∂g
+mi
∂li
∂b
(54)
(where l̃ depicts compensated labour supply) holds. Using these concepts, Equation (53) becomes
∑
i
W ′
∂vi
∂g
+µ∑
i
[
τwi
(
∂l̃i
∂g
+mi
∂li
∂b
)
−π
]
= 0 (55)
⇐⇒∑
i
(
βi
µ
+ τwi
∂li
∂g
)
mi = Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
. (56)
⇐⇒∑
i
ρimi = Nπ−∑
i
τwi
∂l̃i
∂g
. (57)
The left-hand side of this formulation can be written as:
∑
i
ρimi = N ∑i
ρimi
N
+N
∑i ρi
N
∑i mi
N
−N ∑i ρ
i
N
∑i mi
N
(58)
= ∑
i
mi +Ncov
(
ρi,mi
)
.
Rewriting it leads to the rule given in the main text in Equation (9).
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Equality of opportunity and income taxation
Equation (15) can be obtained as follows. First, rewrite the first-order conditions (12) and (13) by adding
and subtracting terms as:
∑
i
βizi +µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
−wili
)
+∑
i
dPi
d(1− τ)
−∑
i
βizi = 0 (59)
∑
i
βi +µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂b
−1
)
+∑
i
dPi
db
−∑
i
βi = 0. (60)
Denote ∑i
dPi
d(1−τ) −∑i β
izi =C(1−τ) and ∑i
dPi
db −∑i β
i =Cb. Multiply Equation (60) by 1N
∑i zi
N and divide
Equation (59) by N. Then subtract the former from the latter to get:
∑i βizi
N
− ∑i β
i
N
∑i zi
N
+
µτ
N
(
∑
i
wi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
−∑
i
wi
∂li
∂b
∑i zi
N
)
+∑
i
dPi
d(1− τ)
+
(
C(1−τ)
n
−Cb
n
∑i z
N
)
= 0.
(61)
Collecting terms then yields the result in the main text.
When the social objective is to achieve an equal distribution of education, the first-order conditions
governing the choice of the tax rate are:
∑
i
O′
∂ei
∂ci
∂ci
∂(1− τ)
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
−wili
)
= 0 (62)
∑
i
O′
∂ei
∂ci
∂ci
∂b
+µ∑
i
(
τwi
∂li
∂b
−1
)
= 0. (63)
Dividing these two yields:
∑i O′
∂ei
∂ci
∂ci
∂(1−τ)
∑i O′
∂e
∂ci
∂ci
∂b
=
wili− τ∑i wi ∂l
i
∂(1−τ)
1− τ∑i wi ∂l
i
∂b
. (64)
Following the steps in Kanbur et al. (2018: 83–84) yields the rule in Equation (16).
Equality of opportunity and commodity taxation
The first-order conditions are:
∑
i
O′
∂ei
∂b
+µ
(
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
−N
)
= 0 (65)
∑
i
O′
∂ei
∂qk
+µ
(
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂qk
+∑
i
xik
)
= 0. (66)
The first one of these can be used if the government is allowed/able to set the demogrant optimally.
Denote again
ρiO = O
′ ∂e
i
∂b
1
µ
+∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
(67)
as the net social marginal utility of income for person i. Equation (65) implies that ρ̄O = 1. Using the
Slutsky equation,
∂xij
∂qk
=
∂x̃ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
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(where x̃ depicts compensated demand), one can rewrite Equation (66) as:
∑
i
O′
1
µ
(
∂ẽi
∂qk
− xik
∂ei
∂b
)
+
[
∑
i
∑
j
t j
(
∂x̃ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
)
+∑
i
xik
]
= 0. (68)
With the help of Equation (67), Slutsky symmetry, and by rearrangement, this can be written as
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂x̃ij
∂q j
= ∑
i
ρiOx
i
k−∑
i
xik−
1
µ∑i
O′
∂ẽi
∂qk
, (69)
which can also be expressed in a covariance format (Equation 23) in the main text.
Equality of opportunity and mixed taxation
The government maximizes its social welfare function subject to the constraints in Equations (31) and
(32). The Lagrangian of this problem is
L =
∫ {
(O [ẽ(q,z,v,w)]+µ(z− px̃)) f +αv′(w)+αEw
Ev
}
dw
=
∫ {
(O [ẽ(q,z,v,w)]+µ(z− px̃)) f −α′v(w)+αEw
Ev
}
dw (70)
+α(∞)v(∞)−α(0)v(0),
where f is the distribution function of abilities and where the equality follows from integration by
parts.
Consider first the first-order condition with respect to commodity prices, q, which is given by∫
O′
(
∂ẽ(q,z,v,w)
∂q
)
f dw−
∫ (
µ
∂x̃(q,z,v,w)
∂q
f +α
∂(Ew/Ev)
∂q
)
dw = 0. (71)
The rule for optimal commodity taxes in the case of mixed taxation (Equation 33) can be derived as
follows. Note first that because of the properties of the expenditure function,
∂(Ew/Ev)
∂q
= (EwqEv−EvqEw)/E2v =
(
∂x̃
∂w
− (Ew/Ev)
∂x̃
∂v
)
/Ev (72)
= E−1v
(
∂x̃
∂w
−uw
∂x̃
∂v
)
= E−1v
∂x
∂w
.
Note also that because of the property q ∂x̃
∂q = 0, one obtains
p
∂x̃
∂q
= (q− t)∂x̃
∂q
=−t ∂x̃
∂q
. (73)
Using these two conditions in Equation (71) gives the expression in Equation (33).
We now turn to the derivation of the effective marginal tax rate. Note that the marginal rate of substitution
between income and expenditure on commodity goods can be written as s =
(
−bz
)
u
= −Ez(q,u,z,w).
This means that
∂(Ew/Ev)
∂z
= E−1v (Ewz− (Ew/Ev)Evz) = E−1v (Ewz− (Ew/Ev)Evzuz) (74)
= E−1v sw(q,z,u,w).
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Also, because
p
∂x̃
∂z
= q
∂x̃
∂z
− (q− p)∂x̃
∂z
= Ez− t(
∂x
∂z
+
∂x
∂b
Ez) =−
(
1− t ∂x
∂b
)
s− t ∂x
∂z
, (75)
one can rewrite the first-order condition in Equation (34) as the rule in Equation (35).
Finally, the Lagrangian in the case of public good provision is:
L =
∫ {
O [e(c̃(z,v,w,g),g)]+µ(z− px̃−πg) f +αv′(w)+αEw
Ev
}
dw
=
∫ {
O [e(c̃(z,v,w,g),g)]+µ(z− px̃−πg) f −α′v(w)+αEw
Ev
}
dw (76)
+α(∞)v(∞)−α(0)v(0),
where the only difference to the Lagrangian in the previous section, in addition to the presence of public
provision in the commodity demand, is the cost of provision that needs to be taken into account in the
resource constraint. The first-order condition with respect to g is:∫
O′
(
∂e
∂c
∂c̃(z,v,w,g)
∂q
+
∂e
∂g
)
f dw−
∫ (
µ
∂x̃(q,z,v,w)
∂g
f −µπ f +α∂(Ew/Ev)
∂g
)
dw = 0. (77)
To derive the optimum condition for public provision of education services under non-linear taxation,
note that
∂(Ew/Ev)
∂g
= E−1v (Ewg−EwEvg/Ev) = E−1v
(
Ewg +Evgv′
)
(78)
= E−1v σw(q,z,u,w),
where σ = vgvb =−Eg. Further, since t = 0, we have:
p
∂x̃
∂g
= q
∂x̃
∂g
= Eg =−σ. (79)
Using these two formulae in Equation (76) leads to the rule in Equation (36).
Fair income taxation
Individuals maximize their utility ui
(
ei,xi, li
)
subject to the budget constraint (1− τ)wili + b = xi +
ci
(
ei
)
. The optimization leads to the indirect utility vi (1− τ,b). The optimal policies maximize the
money-metric measure of the worst-off person ϑo
(
w̄, c̄,vi (1− τ,b)
)
. The government budget constraint
remains intact.
The first-order conditions for optimal policies are:
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂(1− τ)
+µ
(
−∑
i
wili +∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂(1− τ)
)
= 0 (80)
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂b
+µ
(
∑
i
τwi
∂li
∂b
−N
)
= 0. (81)
Dividing these equations side by side and utilizing Roy’s identity gives:
wolo =
∑i wili−∑i τwi∂li/∂(1− τ)
N−∑i τwi∂li/∂b
. (82)
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of Equation (82) by N and expressing
labour supply effects in elasticity form leads to the equation:(
1− τ∑
i
wili
Nb
∂li
∂b
b
li
)
wolo =
∑i wili
N
− τ
1− τ ∑i
wili
N
∂li
∂(1− τ)
1− τ
li
, (83)
which can be rewritten as:
Aθo = 1− τ
1− τ ∑i
θ iε i1−τ . (84)
Here, A ≡ 1− τ∑i w
ili
Nb ε
i
b > 1, ε
i
x is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to x, and θ i ≡ w
ili
∑i wili
.
Equation (84) can be solved for the tax rate, given in Equation (40) in the main text.
Fair public provision
The optimal public provision condition in Equation (41) is directly analogous to the welfarist case. The
proof to obtain Equation (45) is analogous to the proof for Equation (50) in the fair commodity taxation
case presented below.
Fair commodity taxation
Let the consumer price of good j be q j with q j = 1+ t j. Ignoring public provision, the optimal policy
maximizes ϑo = ϑo (c,w,uo (eo,xo, lo)), where the current choices by the individual maximize utility
uo (eo,xo, lo) subject to the budget constraint wolo +b≥ ∑ j q jxoj + co (eo). This gives the indirect utility
vo (q,b) with q denoting the vector of consumer prices. The social welfare function now becomes ϑo =
ϑo (c,w,vo (q,b)). The government maximizes this with the budget constraint (as above in the welfarist
case): ∑i ∑ j t jxij = Nb+R, where the individual choices of consumption, labour supply, and education
depend on tax rates t j and the lump sum income b. The first-order conditions are:
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂qk
+µ
(
∑
i
xik +∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂qk
)
= 0 (85)
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂b
+µ
(
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
)
−µN = 0. (86)
Denote βoF =
∂ϑo
∂vo
∂vo
∂b for the worst-off person o. For all other i 6= o, β
i
F = 0. The direct marginal weight
of a person in social welfare is 0 for all others than the worst-off person.7
As ∂v
∂qk
= − ∂v
∂b xk for any indirect utility function, Equation (85) can be rewritten (recalling that β
i
F =
0, i = 1, ...,N−1) as:
−∑
i
βiFx
i
k +µ
(
∑
i
xik +∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂qk
)
= 0. (87)
7 This is not true of the net social marginal utility of income of a person (see Equation 49). The net social marginal utility
of a person other than the worst-off is positive if the change in her consumption due to a higher lump sup transfer increases
commodity tax revenue, and negative in the reverse case.
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Also, Equation (86) can be rewritten as:
∑
i
βiF +µ
(
∑
i
∑
j
t j
∂xij
∂b
)
= µN. (88)
Now Equations (87) and (88) are formally identical to their counterparts in the welfarist case. The tax
rule in Equation (48) can be derived from Equation (88) using the Slutsky equation
∂xij
∂qk
=
∂x̃ij
∂qk
− xik
∂xij
∂b
and Slutsky symmetry.
In order to prove Equation (50), note first that the term in the right-hand side is obtained in a fashion
similar to the commodity taxation case in the appendix of (Kanbur et al. 2018) by using ∑i ρ
i
F
N = 1 (implied
by Equation 88).
By definition
Ncov
(
ρiF ,x
i
k
)
=
(
βo
µ
+∑
i
t j
∂xoj
∂b
−1
)(
xok− x̄k
)
(89)
+
(
∑
i
t j
∂x1j
∂b
−1
)(
x1k− x̄k
)
+ ...+
(
∑
i
t j
∂xN−1j
∂b
−1
)(
xN−1k − x̄
k
)
.
Use Equation (88) again to get:
βo
µ
= N−∑
j
t j
∂xoj
∂b
− ...∑
j
t j
∂xN−1j
∂b
. (90)
Substitute this in the covariance expression and note that xik− x̄k = xik− xok + xok− x̄k to get the following
expression:
Ncov
(
ρiF ,x
i
k
)
=
(
1−∑
i
t j
∂x1
∂b
)(
xok− x1k
)
+ ...+
(
1−∑
i
t j
∂xN−1
∂b
)(
xok− xN−1k
)
. (91)
By rearranging this, one can separate out terms in xok and the sum of other consumption levels. Requiring
then the covariance to be negative results in Equation (50).
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